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Abstract
Many policymakers view power outages as a major constraint on firm productivity in
developing countries. Yet empirical studies find modest short-run effects of outages on firm
performance. This paper builds a dynamic macroeconomic model to study the long-run
general-equilibrium effects of power outages on productivity. Outages lower productivity in
the model by creating idle resources, depressing the scale of incumbent firms and reducing
entry of new firms. Consistent with the empirical literature, the model predicts small short-
run effects of eliminating outages. However, the long-run general-equilibrium effects are
much larger, supporting the view that eliminating outages is an important development
objective.
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1. Introduction
Most firms in the developing world put inadequate electricity supply at or near the top of their
list of constraints holding back their productivity (World Bank Group, 2017). Not surprisingly
then, improving electricity provision has emerged as a top policy priority for many developing
countries to promote economic growth. Yet, most existing empirical studies of the effects of
power outages on firm productivity have found fairly modest impacts. For example, Allcott,
Collard-Wexler, and O’Connell (2016) estimate that Indian manufacturing firms operate at a
mere 1.5 percent lower productive level on average due to the (widespread) electricity outages
they face. Similar studies also find that power outages lead to small short-run declines in firm
productivity across a broad set of developing countries.1 More generally, a growing micro
literature on the effects on electrification has found negligible short-run economic impacts, at
least in rural areas (Dinkelman, 2011; Burlig and Preonas, 2016; Lee, Miguel, and Wolfram,
Forthcoming). Given the massive differences in aggregate output per capita across countries
(Hall and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005), these modest estimated effects of electricity suggest that
policymakers could be overemphasizing its importance in their development strategy.
In contrast to the previous work, this paper models and quantifies the long-run, general equi-
librium effects of electricity on firm and aggregate productivity, which we find are much larger
than the effects estimated by the literature thus far. To do so, we build a new dynamic macro
model that incorporates several key aspects of how electricity is provided in the developing
world, and how firms respond, dynamically, to an unreliable electricity supply. First, electricity
is a strong complement to capital in the production function and other inputs cannot be easily
be substituted for electricity (Atkeson and Kehoe, 1999; Hassler, Krusell, and Olovsson, 2015;
Casey, 2018). Second, electricity is provided through the grid at a low price but rationed,
with unpredictable power outages occurring in equilibrium (consistent with the evidence of
Burgess, Greenstone, Ryan, and Sudarshan, 2020). Third, some firms self-produce electricity
using generators, though at a higher cost than electricity purchased from the grid. Fourth,
firms can choose not to enter the “modern” electricity-using sector at all, and instead operate
a low-productivity “traditional” technology (as in Midrigan and Xu, 2014) that doesn’t require
electricity. Finally, grid electricity supply endogenously responds to electricity prices, with out-
ages occurring in equilibrium only when prices are held below the market-clearing level.
1Fisher-Vanden, Mansur, and Wang (2015) find a statistically insignificant effect of power outages on firm
productivity in a panel of Chinese manufacturing firms. Abeberese, Ackah, and Asuming (2019) and Hardy and
McCasland (2019) estimate that outages reduce productivity by 10 to 13 percent for small firms in Ghana, but find
no effect on productivity for all other firms. Grainger and Zhang (2017) estimate that outages lead to productivity
decreases of less than one percent in Pakistan. Scott, Darko, Lemma, and Rud (2014) find small and generally
insignificant correlations between the number of power outages a firm experiences and its labor productivity
across a sample of six major developing economies.
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To analytically illustrate how power outages affect firm productivity, we first present a simple
version of the model in which the probability of a power outage is exogenous. Power outages
are unpredictable in the sense that firms know the probability that the power will be on, but
they do not know when it will be on. These unpredictable outages create idle resources in
equilibrium. When the power is off, modern firms idle productive capital if they do not have
enough generator capital. When the power is on, modern firms instead idle their generator
capital, because the marginal cost of self-generated electricity is higher than the price of grid
electricity. We measure the short-run partial-equilibrium effect of eliminating power outages
by simulating a counterfactual scenario under which firms make entry and scale decisions
assuming that the probability of grid power is less than one, but then experience no outages ex-
post. This exercise captures the spirit of the empirical literature described above which focuses
on ceteris paribus regression counterfactuals, assuming that firms face no power outages, but
that all else is constant. We show that eliminating outages increases output per worker in the
short-run partial equilibrium only because productive capital is no longer idled.
By contrast, we simulate the long-run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages by solv-
ing for a new steady state of the model in which firms get grid electricity with probability one.
The long-run general-equilibrium effect includes the increases in output per worker from not
idling productive capital, as in the short-run partial-equilibrium, plus two additional channels.
First, the incumbent modern firms, who now expect never to idle capital in an outage again,
demand more productive capital and zero generator capital. Since in steady state, the rental
rate on capital is pinned down entirely by the household Euler equation, capital supply, rather
than the price of capital, expands to meet the new demand from firms. Second, when there
are no outages, more firms produce with the modern technology, which is more attractive now
that grid electricity is reliably available.
To quantify the importance of eliminating power outages on firm and aggregate productivity,
we extend the simple model to a richer quantitative version which endogenizes the probability
of a power outage through a distorted electricity-production sector. We set the electricity price
below its market-clearing value, as in the evidence of Burgess et al. (2020), which leads elec-
tricity producers to restrict supply. Thus, instead of the price clearing the electricity market, the
extent of power outages is determined so that the rationed supply of grid electricity equals the
demand at the regulated price. We calibrate the model to match the main features of electric-
ity use in five large Sub-Saharan African countries. The key targets to inform our quantitative
analysis are: the importance of electricity in production, the cost of generator electricity ver-
sus grid electricity and the overall prevalence of self-generated electricity, including both the
number of firms that have generators and how much electricity those firms self-produce. The
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calibrated model does well at matching relationships we observe in the data but do not directly
target, including the well-known positive correlation between generator ownership and firm
size.
We use the calibrated model to simulate the long-run general-equilibrium effects of eliminating
power outages on the macroeconomy. In each country, we compare outcomes in an undistorted
steady state with no power outages to their values in the initial calibrated steady state, which
has widespread outages. To compute the undistorted steady state, we remove the electricity
price regulations and allow the price to adjust freely to clear the electricity market. Our model
predicts that the short-run partial-equilibrium effects are modest, on the order of a few per-
centage points. These small effects mirror the estimates from the microeconomic literature on
electricity and firm productivity, lending credence to the model’s short-run partial-equilibrium
predictions. In contrast, the long-run general-equilibrium effects of eliminating power outages
are around four times larger, averaging 20 percent across our countries.2 Through the lens of
development accounting, eliminating power outages works through both higher aggregate cap-
ital per worker and higher measured TFP, as fewer resources are idled and production moves
into the modern sector.
We conclude by providing new evidence that helps validate the model’s long-run aggregate
predictions, which are harder to test in practice. We conduct new surveys of firms in Nigeria
and Ghana about the expected effects of permanently eliminating power outages. The majority
of Ghanaian and Nigerian firms report that eliminating outages would be likely or very likely to
expand their own investment and hiring, consistent with the model’s firm-expansion channel.
An even larger fraction of firms in both countries expect that permanently eliminating outages
would lead to entry of new firms into their industry, just as the model’s firm-entry channel
predicts. As a frame of reference, we also surveyed firms from the same population about the
likely effects of a placebo “treatment” in which the national airports convert to solar power, on
the exact same outcomes. Across both countries and all questions, the expected effects of elim-
inating power outages are economically and statistically larger than the effects of the placebo,
suggesting that our results are unlikely to be artifacts of misreporting by survey respondents.
Our paper builds on two distinct literatures in macroeconomics. The first is the growing macro
development literature that draws on dynamic general equilibrium models to understand how
the partial equilibrium effects of development policies– informed by reduced-form empirical
2These larger longer-run effects are similar in spirit to the literature on the long-run regional effects of elec-
tricity (Rud, 2012; Lipscomb, Mobarak, and Barham, 2013), who find large long-run differences in economic
development across regions within countries with differing levels of electrification. Rud (2012) studies a panel
of Indian states between 1965 and 1984, while Lipscomb et al. (2013) consider a panel of Brazilian states from
1960 to 2000.
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evidence– compare to the long-run general equilibrium effects. Our quantitative exercises are
particularly related to those of Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2019), who use a macroeconomic
model of credit constrained firms to infer how the general equilibrium effects of microfinance
lending differ from the partial equilibrium effects estimated in the empirical literature on micro
finance. Also in this vein, Brooks and Donovan (Forthcoming) flush out the general-equilibrium
effects of improved transportation infrastructure on rural farmers starting with reduced-form
evidence on the effects of rural bridge building. Using a similar methodology, Lagakos, Mo-
barak, and Waugh (2020) quantify the aggregate effects of subsides to rural-urban migration,
and Akcigit, Alp, and Peters (Forthcoming) infer the general equilibrium effects of improving
managerial capabilities.
The second literature on which we build is the recent literature on sector linkages and devel-
opment, which studies how low productivity in one intermediate sector – especially one that
exhibits a high degree of complementarity with other sectors– can have a disproportionate ef-
fect on aggregate output per worker (Jones, 2011; Bartelme and Gorodnichenko, 2015; Baqaee
and Farhi, 2019).3 Electricity is a classic example of such an input, and our paper is the first to
study the general equilibrium implications of distortions in the electricity sector. We illustrate
how the distortions in the electricity sector lead to larger aggregate gains than the general dis-
tortions analyzed by most studies in this literature because the artificially low electricity price
depresses electricity supply relative to a competitive economy. Boehm and Oberfield (2018)
focus on a different type of distortion stemming from a government inability to enforce con-
tracts between firms, and study how that propagates through linked sectors. Liu (2019) builds
a model in which distortions at the sector level accumulate through backward demand link-
ages. The most upstream sectors become the “sink” for market imperfections, which may well
apply to electricity production, though this channel is not present in the current model. Baqaee
and Farhi (2020) show that sectoral shocks in a distorted economy, such as ours, can be far
more potent than in an efficient one, since moving resources out of a distorted sector can have
first-order effects on output.4
3Most of this literature has focused on business cycle fluctuations, rather than long-run outcomes, and has
largely concluded that input-output linkages play an important role in amplifying short-run microeconomic
shocks; see Carvalho (2014) for an insightful overview of the literature. Empirically, di Giovanni, Levchenko,
and Méjean (2014) draw on rich firm-level data to document that firm-specific shocks contribute to aggregate
fluctuations mainly through firm-to-firm linkages. Similarly, Atalay (2017) shows that outputs at the sector level
are strong complements, implying that shocks to individual sectors have out sized aggregate impacts.
4Additionally, our paper relates to the literature that studies general equilibrium models of energy use and the
macroeconomy (see e.g. Hassler, Krusell, and Smith, Jr., 2016, for an overview). Much of this literature focuses
on the macroeconomic and environmental impacts of a carbon tax. Previous studies explore these impacts in
a variety of different settings, including neoclassical growth frameworks, (e.g., Golosov, Hassler, Krusell, and
Tsyvinski, 2014; Barrage, 2019; Fried, Novan, and Peterman, 2018) and models of endogenous innovation (e.g.,
Acemoglu, Aghion, Bursztyn, and Hémous, 2012; Hémous, 2016; Casey, 2018; Fried, 2018; Lemoine, 2018). A
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2. Electricity and Firms in the Developing World: Stylized Facts
To motivate our model of electricity and firm productivity, we begin by summarizing four key
facts about electricity in developing countries. To be sure, these facts are known by those
who study electricity in developing countries, though they are likely to be less well known by
macroeconomists. First, grid electricity is rationed to firms through frequent and unpredictable
power outages. Second, some firms use generators to produce their own electricity to insure
themselves against grid electricity shortages. Third, the cost to firms of self-generated electric-
ity is substantially higher than the cost of grid electricity. Fourth, the electricity sector itself is
highly distorted, with prices held at below-market levels in most countries.
Firms experience frequent unpredictable power outages. Unlike in advanced economies,
the electricity grid is highly unreliable in developing countries. Even firms with grid connec-
tions still experience frequent and unpredictable power outages (see e.g., Eberhard, Rosnes,
Shkaratan, and Vennemo 2011; Scott et al. 2014). To illustrate how frequent power outages
are in the developing world, we draw on evidence from the World Bank’s World Enterprise
Surveys (WES), which cover random samples of medium and large firms from a large set of
countries (though the richest countries are excluded).
Figure 1 plots the percent of firms in the WES that report having experienced an electricity
outage in the last month against GDP per capita. Each point on the graph represents the
averages for all firms sampled in the WES by country in the most recent available year. The
figure presents a very stark picture of how common electricity outages are in the developing
world. In most of the word’s poorest countries, more than eight out of ten firms experienced
an outage in the last month. Across all countries in the data, the average percent of firms
experiencing outages is 55 percent. There is also a clear negative relationship with outages
and GDP per capita; nearly all the firms in the poorest countries experienced outages in the
last month, but only one quarter of the firms experienced outages in the WES countries with
the highest GDP per capita. The world’s richest countries are not covered by the WES, but it is
well-known that outages there are extremely infrequent. Power outages are, in other words,
almost a defining feature of developing economies.
Some firms self-generate electricity to insure against outages. Since electricity outages
are clearly undesirable for firms, many of them self-produce electricity using generators (Alby,
Dethier, and Straub 2013; Eberhard et al. 2011; Foster and Steinbuks 2008). The ability to self-
produce electricity allows firms access to electricity during an outage, which must be valuable
common theme is that there is an important role for energy in the production function, though we abstract from
environmental factors.
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Figure 1: Percent of Firms Experiencing Electricity Outages
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Note: This figure plots the percent of firms in the World Bank’s World Enterprise Surveys that experienced
an electricity outage in the last month against 2013 GDP per capita. The figure includes all countries with a
population greater than five million and a survey covering at least one hundred firms.
given the frequency of outages. To see how much self-generation goes on in practice in the
developing world, we turn again to the WES, at least for evidence on self-generation among
the relatively large firms that make up the WES sample. We focus on a set of ten large African
countries for which we have comparable data on other dimensions, which we discuss below.
Figure 2 plots the percent of firms in the WES that own or share a generator at the time of the
survey in these ten countries. The generator ownership rate is 48 percent on average across
these countries. Nigeria, which is Africa’s largest economy, has the highest generator owner-
ship rate, at 71 percent. Madagascar has the lowest rate at 19 percent. When looking across
all countries in the WES, there is a strong negative correlation between generator ownership
and GDP per capita, with less than 10 percent of firms in the richest WES countries owning
generators. Thus, it is clear that many firms in the developing world use generators to insure
themselves against outages, though far from all firms have access to generators
Self-generated electricity is more expensive than grid electricity. Even though firms can
produce their own electricity, this does not mean that firms are indifferent between getting
their electricity from the grid or producing it themselves using generators. Evidence shows
that self-generated electricity is substantially more costly for firms than grid electricity (Foster
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Note: This figure plots the percent of firms that own or share a generator in the ten most populous countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa that have the data required for both Figures 2 and 3. The data on generator access are
from the World Bank’s World Enterprise Surveys.
and Steinbuks, 2008).
Figure 3 plots estimates of the average cost of grid electricity and self-generated electricity in
the ten largest Sub-Saharan African countries for which data are available. The average cost of
self-generated electricity includes the capital costs of owning a generator, based on estimates
in World Bank (2007), plus the cost of fuel for the generator (see Appendix C for details on
these calculations).
The average cost of self-generated electricity ranges from a low of $0.34 per kWh in Ethiopia
to a high of $0.45 per kWh in Mozambique (reflecting differences in the price of fuel). Grid
electricity prices range from $0.04 per kWh in Ethiopia to $0.17 per kWh in Uganda (Trimble,
Kojima, Arroyo, and Mohammadzadeh, 2016). The variation in the grid electricity price likely
reflects differences in official tariffs as well as differences in bill collection rates and theft. On
average, self-generated electricity is approximately four times as expensive as grid electricity.
Importantly, the high average cost of self-generated electricity results from both the high cost
of the generator equipment and the high cost of the fuel necessary to run it. The marginal
cost of self-generated electricity, which depends on the price of diesel fuel and the efficiency
of the generator, is on average three times higher than the price of grid electricity. Thus, while
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Note: This figure plots the effective price of grid electricity and the average cost of self-generated electricity
in the ten most populous countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which data are available. Data on the effective
price of grid electricity, accounting for theft and lapses in bill collection, are from Trimble et al. (2016). We
calculate the average cost of generator electricity from estimates of the capital cost of a typical diesel generator
from World Bank (2007) and the price of diesel fuel. See Appendix C for a full description.
firms with generators do have the ability to produce their own power during an outage, the
cost of their electricity inputs are substantially higher when they self-produce, than when they
directly purchase electricity from the grid.
Grid electricity provision is highly distorted. It is well known that the public sector regulates
electricity providers in most countries. The developing world provides few exceptions to this
rule. Moreover, as Trimble et al. (2016) document, virtually none of the electricity sectors in
Sub-Saharan Africa collect enough revenue to recover their costs. One reason for this is the
low official tariffs for electricity. Burgess et al. (2020) argue that governments in developing
countries present electricity as a basic right for their citizens, and, as a result, political incentives
play a substantial role in keeping electricity prices regulated at levels that are unprofitable for
power producers.
A second, related, reason that electricity prices are so low is the rampant non-payment that
prevails throughout the developing world (see Jack and Smith, 2015). As Burgess et al. (2020)
colorfully illustrate, power producers in the power sectors of Bihar, India have an official rate
of $0.10 per kWh, which should, in principle, be enough to cover their production cost of
about $0.06 per kWh. Yet power producers collect only around $0.01 per kWh after subsidies,
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technical losses, un-billed power and unpaid bills are taken into consideration! While the
numbers differ in Africa, the problems are largely similar: technical losses, un-billed power
and underpayment all cut into the effective prices of grid electricity (Eberhard et al. 2011;
Jack and Smith 2015; Dzansi, Puller, Street, and Yebuah-Dwamena 2018).
In sum, the price of grid electricity is regulated to be too low across the developing world, and
this regulation is the proximate cause of the widespread power outages there (Burgess et al.,
2020; Eberhard et al., 2011). Some firms can insure against these outages by producing their
own electricity with generators. However, the self-generation of electricity is expensive because
both the average and marginal cost of self-generated electricity are considerably higher than
the effective price of grid electricity.
3. Simple Model of Electricity and Firm Productivity
We now build a simple, dynamic, general-equilibrium model that incorporates the key features
of electricity supply in developing countries presented in the previous section. The model is
intentionally stylized to provide an analytic characterization of how power outages impact firm
productivity in general equilibrium. In particular, the model takes the probability of grid power
as exogenous, abstracts from hired labor input and assumes that the price of grid electricity is
zero. We relax all of these assumptions in Section 4 to follow. We relegate all proofs and the
definition of an equilibrium to Appendix A.
Environment. The economy is inhabited by a representative household that chooses consump-





where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, Ct is consumption, and u(·) is a concave, strictly in-
creasing and continuously differentiable period utility function. Households save in physical
capital. Capital accumulates according to the standard law of motion:
Kt+1= (1−δ)Kt+ It , (2)
where δ∈ [0,1] is the depreciation rate and It is the number of final goods saved as investment.
Households rent capital to firms at rate Rt . Household income includes the payments to capital
and profits from the firms (described below).
There is a unit measure of heterogeneous entrepreneurs that operate firms and produce a
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homogeneous final good using their managerial ability and capital input. Each entrepreneur
draws her managerial ability, z, from distribution G(z)with support z ∈ [1,∞]. Entrepreneurs
can choose to operate either in the “traditional sector” or in the “modern sector”. The sectors
differ in terms of their production technologies and associated input requirements. If the en-
trepreneur chooses to operate in the modern sector, she must pay an entry cost, Ω.




where yTt is output of the final good, k
T
t is the capital input and η ∈ [0,1] measures the en-
trepreneur’s span of control. The traditional entrepreneur chooses capital to maximize profits,
πT , where profits are the difference between production and rental payments for capital.
The production technology in the modern sector differs from that of the traditional sector in
two ways. First, it uses managerial and capital inputs more efficiently. Second, it requires elec-
tricity. As discussed in Section 2, the supply of grid electricity is rationed and unpredictable,
meaning frequent power outages. To incorporate this unpredictable rationing into the model,
we divide the time period into a continuum of measure one of “instants.” We model the avail-
ability of grid power in each instant i of period t as the realization of an exogenous random
variable: with probability v, grid power is available in instant i and with probability 1− v, grid
power is not available. As such, v corresponds to the fraction of the period that the power is
on and 1− v corresponds to the fraction of the period that the power is off.
Following Hassler et al. (2015), the modern firm’s output in each instant i, yMit , is a Leontief




min(kMt , ei t)
η
, (4)
where ei t is the electricity that the firm uses during instant i to operate her capital input, and





ensures that entrepreneurs operate in both sectors in equilibrium. When capital and electricity
inputs are equated, the production function equals AMz1−η[kMt ]
η, mirroring the production
function in the traditional sector, but with higher productivity.
All instants when grid power is on are symmetric and all instants when grid power is off are
symmetric. Let yM1t denote output during any instant when the power is on and y
M
0t denote
output during any instant when the power is off. The firm’s total output in period t, yMt , equals
the sum of output during the instants when grid power is on and output during the instants
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when grid power is off:





There are two ways a modern firm can acquire electricity in each instant. First, if available,
it can get it from the electricity grid, eGit , at a “below-market” price that we set to zero for
simplicity. Second, a fraction of modern firms can produce their own electricity, eSit , at a higher
cost. As discussed in Section 2, many, but not all, modern firms in low-income economies
have access to generators. Some modern firms might not have generators because of financing
constraints, lack of markets for generators, poor distribution networks for diesel fuel, or lack
of parts or repair facilities (Scott et al., 2014). We do not take a stand on why some modern
firms do not have generator access. Instead, we assume that a fraction γ of modern firms have
access to generators and a fraction 1−γ do not. An entrepreneur learns if she has generator
access after she enters the modern sector. Importantly, while generator access grants the firm
the ability to rent a generator and produce its own electricity, it does not require the firm to do
so. Firms with generator access endogenously decide how much electricity to self-produce, if
any.
Grid and self-generated electricity are perfect substitutes in the production of the final good.
For example, if a machine requires five kilowatt-hours of electricity to operate, it does not
matter if those kilowatt-hours are produced by a diesel generator or by a coal-fired power
plant. To generate its own electricity in instant i, the firm combines self-generation capital, kSt ,
with fuel, fi t (denominated in units of final good), according to:
eSit =min[k
S
t , fi t]. (6)
The marginal cost of a unit of grid electricity is one unit of the final good, which is used as fuel
for the generator. Since all instants without power are symmetric, we use the notation f0t to
denote the firm’s demand for fuel during any instant without power.
Power outages in the model correspond to instants when the power is off and the firm produces
y0t . The direct effect of these outages for firms with generators is that they must self-produce
all of their electricity inputs. If they do not have enough generator capital to operate their
productive capital at full capacity, then they must idle some productive capital, partially halting
production. The direct effect of outages for firms without generators is to halt all production.
In practice, power outages often require halting production because they lead to assembly line
disruptions, failure of electrically operated machines, and loss of lighting (Scott et al., 2014).
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Modern firm’s problem. We first describe the optimization problem for modern firms with
generator access. At the start of period t, each modern firm chooses its capital input, kMt , and
generator capital, kSt , both of which are then fixed for the entire period. During each instant,
the firm chooses its electricity input. If the grid power is on, the firm gets electricity from the
grid (since it has zero marginal cost). If the grid power is off, the firm either produces its
own electricity or simply idles its capital input. The firm’s profits are the difference between
production and the costs of generator capital, productive capital and fuel:









Importantly, the firm only pays for fuel during instants when the power is off. In contrast, the
firm must rent the generator and productive capital for the entire period. Since power outages
are unpredictable, as discussed in Section 2, firms cannot rent a generator only when the power
is off, or productive capital only when the power is on.
Profit maximization in the presence of power outages presents firms with a dismal trade-off.
A firm can purchase enough generator capital to operate its productive capital at full capacity
when the power is off. But then it must idle generator capital when the power is on. Alterna-
tively, the firm can purchase less generator capital, and thus reduce its idle generator capital
when the power is on. But then it must idle some of its productive capital when the power is
off.




1t , and f0t to maximize profits, taking
the probability of grid power, v, and the rental rate of capital, Rt , as given. The Lagrangian for
the firm’s problem can be written as:
















where θ represents the Lagrange multiplier on the inequality constraint that kSt ≤ k
M
t . This in-
equality constraint arises from the firm’s trade-off between idling productive capital and idling
generator capital. In particular, it is never optimal to produce more self-generated electricity
than is required to operate the productive capital, implying that generator capital will never
exceed productive capital, i.e. kSt ≤ k
M
t . However, it could be optimal to hold less generator
capital than is necessary to operate the productive capital at full capacity when the power is




5By contrast, the other Leontief production functions – (4) when the power is on, and (6) when the power
is off – both hold with equality. That is, f0t = kSt , since it is never optimal to purchase more or less fuel than is
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Power on: no generator
Power off: no generator
Note: The green solid line and o’s plot production by a modern firm with generator access when the power
is on and off, respectively. The blue dashed line and x’s plot production by a modern firm without generator
access when the power is on and off, respectively. Value v? corresponds to the cutoff from Proposition 1.
The optimization problem for modern firms without generator access is similar to the above
discussion except that generator capital always equals zero. Hence, the firm must idle all of
its productive capital input during an outage, implying that its profits equal equation (7) with
the self-generation terms set to zero: y0t = f0t = kSt = 0.
We now characterize how the availability of grid power, v, affects modern firms’ optimal levels
of productive capital and of generator capital (for those firms with generator access).
Proposition 1. The firm’s productive capital input is increasing in the probability of grid electric-
ity, v, for any Rt . Firms with generator access idle generator capital when the power is on for any
v < 1. For these firms, there exists a cutoff v∗(Rt)∈ (0,1) such that when v < v∗(Rt), generator
capital is increasing in v and no productive capital is idled. When v ≥ v∗(Rt), generator capital
is decreasing in v and productive capital is idled when the power is off. Generator capital equals
zero when v= 1.
Figure 4 illustrates the implications of Proposition 1 for optimal production by modern firms
necessary to operate the generator capital at full capacity when the power is out, and eG0t = k
M
t , since it is never
optimal to use more or less grid electricity than is necessary to operate the productive capital when the power is
on.
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with a given productivity, z. The green solid line and the green o’s plot production by modern
firms with generator access during instants when the power is on and off, respectively. Simi-
larly, the blue dashed line and the blue x’s plot production by modern firms without generator
access during instants when the power is on and off. Moving from left to right on the x-axis
increases the probability of grid power from zero (no grid power) to one (no outages). The
value v? corresponds to the threshold in Proposition 1, beyond which firms with generators
choose to idle some productive capital during an outage.
We focus first on the production decisions by the firms with generator access (green solid line
and o’s). When v < v?, firms operate their productive capital at full capacity when the power
is off, implying that output is the same during instants with and without grid power. When
v > v?, firms idle some of their productive capital when the power is off. As a result, output
is lower when the power is off than when the power is on. When v > v?, output when the
power is off decreases with v because firms rent less generator capital as the probability of grid
power increases. The intuition is that when v is high, outages are sufficiently rare such that it
is optimal for firms to idle some of their productive capital during the occasional outage.
We turn next to the firms without generator access. Regardless of the probability of grid power,
these firms cannot produce when the power is off, hence the blue x’s always equal zero. When
the power is on and v < v?, output produced by firms without generator access is less than
output produced by firms with generator access (e.g. the dashed blue line is below the solid
green line). The marginal product of productive capital is lower for firms without generator
access because they must idle this capital for fraction 1− v of the period. As a result, they rent
less productive capital and thus produce less output when the power is on. In contrast, when
v ≥ v?, output produced by firms with and without generator access is equal during instants
with grid power. In this region, the marginal product of productive capital is the same for
firms with and without generator access because both types of firms idle the marginal unit of
productive capital when the power is off.
Importantly, output when the power is on increases with the probability of grid power for all
modern firms (e.g., the solid green and dashed blue lines are upward sloping). The reason
is that increases in the probability of grid power increase the marginal product of productive
capital because it is idled for a smaller fraction of the period (for modern firms without gen-
erators, and for all modern firms when v > v?) and because having access to grid power for a
longer fraction of the period reduces the average cost of electricity over the period (for mod-
ern firms with generators). As a result, all modern firms scale up production by renting more
productive capital. Additionally, note that among modern firms with generators, a marginal
increase in the probability of grid power results in a larger increase in output when v > v?,
14
than when v< v? (e.g., the slope of the solid green line is steeper when v> v?). When v< v?,
firms optimally choose to purchase enough generator capital to produce at full capacity when
the power is off, implying that any increase in scale in response to an increase in v requires
more productive capital and more generator capital. In contrast, when v > v?, firms’ optimal
demand for generator capital falls with v. Thus, any increase in scale in response to an increase
in v in this region requires an increase in productive capital but a decrease in generator capital.
We define the short-run partial-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages as the increase in the
firm’s output when it learns that there will be no outages ex-post, after it has already made its
long-term input decisions. This definition captures the spirit of the microeconomic literature on
power outages and firm productivity which considers the effect of eliminating outages on firms
who have already made their entry and scale decisions. We can use Figure 4 to understand
the short-run partial-equilibrium effects of eliminating outages in the context of our model.
For example, consider an economy with probability of grid power v1. The short-run partial-
equilibrium effect of eliminating outages for firms without generator access is the increase in
output when they produce at point B for the entire period, instead of switching between points
B and C. The short-run partial-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages for firms with genera-
tor access is zero because they produce at point A for the entire period, regardless of whether
the power is on or off. Hence, all of the short-run partial-equilibrium gains in output per worker
arise because firms without generator access no longer idle productive capital. However, elim-
inating outages in the short-run partial-equilibrium does not remove idle resources from the
economy altogether because firms with generator access still rent generators, which they now
idle for the entire period.
In addition to firms’ short-run partial-equilibrium response to outages, Proposition 1 implies
that eliminating outages causes existing modern firms to demand more productive capital and
zero generator capital, all else constant. This increase in scale implies that not only do the
firms produce on the power-on line for the entire period, but they also incorporate that v = 1
into their optimal production decisions by moving all the way to the right along the x-axis in
Figure 1. Consequently, eliminating outages (holding fixed Rt) increases output produced by
modern firms with and without generator access to point D in the upper-right corner of Figure
4. Like the short-run partial-equilibrium effect, firms do not idle productive capital at point
D because the power is on for the entire period. But unlike the short-run partial-equilibrium
effect, firms also do not idle generator capital at point D because they know ex-ante that there
will be no outages, and hence they do not rent any generator capital to begin with.
Modern-sector entry. Having characterized the optimal behavior of firms in the modern sector,
we now turn to the decision of whether or not to enter the modern sector. The entrepreneur
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enters the modern sector if the expected value of profits in the modern sector minus the entry




where the expectation is taken over whether not the entrepreneur has generator access. We
show in Appendix A that as long as there exist entrepreneurs in both sectors, then the difference
in expected profits, E(πMt )−π
T
t , is increasing in z. Thus all entrepreneurs with z> z
?
t enter the
modern sector, where productivity cutoff z?t is the value of z such that equation (9) holds with
equality. This result implies that lower productivity entrepreneurs operate in the traditional
sector and higher productivity entrepreneurs operate in the modern sector. Firm size increases
with the entrepreneur’s productivity, thus the smallest firms are traditional and the largest firms
are modern.
Long-run general-equilibrium effects of power outages. We define the long-run general-
equilibrium effect of eliminating outages as the steady state increase in aggregate output (and
other equilibrium variables) when we increase the probability of grid power from its existing
value to one. We first characterize how the probability of grid power affects entry into the
modern sector in the long-run general equilibrium.
Proposition 2. The steady-state productivity cutoff, z?, is decreasing in the probability of grid
power, v.
Intuitively, an increase in the probability of grid power raises the profitability of the modern
sector without impacting the profitability of the traditional sector. Consequently, more en-
trepreneurs choose to become modern, decreasing the productivity cutoff, z?.
Our analytic model allows us to compare the short-run partial-equilibrium effect of eliminat-
ing outages with the long-run general-equilibrium effect. The short-run partial-equilibrium
effect corresponds to the increase in aggregate output when power outages are eliminated ex-
post. The long-run general-equilibrium effect incorporates the effects of two additional chan-
nels. First, since the steady-state rental rate is pinned down by the household Euler equation,
Proposition 1 implies that all existing modern firms scale up their production by demanding
more productive capital and reducing their demand for generator capital to zero. We call this
the firm-expansion channel. Second, Proposition 2 implies that more entrepreneurs enter the
modern sector, increasing modern output and decreasing traditional output. We call this the
firm-entry channel. A key difference between the short-run partial-equilibrium and the long-
run general-equilibrium effects is that the long-run general-equilibrium effect accounts for the
fact that permanently eliminating outages changes firms’ expectations and hence their behav-
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Note: The dashed blue line plots aggregate modern-sector output. The solid green line plots aggregate modern
output when firms make their entry and scale decisions assuming the probability of grid power equals the value
of v on the x-axis but the actual probability equals one. The short-run partial-equilibrium increase in aggregate
modern output equals the vertical distance from A to C and the long-run general-equilibrium increase equals
the vertical distance from A to B.
ior with regards to entry and their scale of operation, represented by their choices of productive
and generator capital.
Proposition 3. For any v < 1, the long-run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages is
larger than the short-run partial-equilibrium effect.
Figure 5 illustrates the implications of Proposition 3 for aggregate modern output, which is at
the heart of the proposition’s result. The dashed blue line plots aggregate modern output as a
function of the probability of grid power. Increases in the probability of grid power increase
aggregate modern output through both the firm-expansion and the firm-entry channels. The
solid green line plots aggregate modern output when outages are eliminated after firms have
already made their capital and entry decisions.
To compare the short-run partial-equilibrium increase in aggregate modern output with the
long-run general-equilibrium increase, consider an economy with probability of grid power,
v1. The short-run partial-equilibrium increase in aggregate modern output from eliminating
outages is the increase from point A to point C. Point A corresponds to aggregate modern
output when the probability of grid power equals v1 and firms internalize this probability into
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their entry and capital decisions. Point C corresponds to aggregate modern output when firms
make their entry and capital decisions assuming that the probability of grid power equals v1,
but the actual probability equals 1. Aggregate modern output at point C is higher than at point
A because firms produce on their power-on lines in Figure 4 for the entire period.
The long-run general-equilibrium increase accounts for the effects of the firm-expansion and
firm-entry channels by moving all the way to the right on the x-axis, increasing aggregate
modern output from point A to point B. Graphically, the increase in aggregate modern output
from A to B will always exceed the increase from A to C because the firm-expansion and firm-
entry channels imply that both lines must be upward sloping and they must be equal when
v= 1.
The overall lesson from the model is that looking only at the short-run effect of eliminating
outages on firm productivity paints an incomplete picture of the total effect. In the longer
run, firms anticipate that there will be no outages. As a result, they demand more productive
capital and zero generator capital, scaling up their operations. New firms choose to operate
with better, electricity-using, technologies. Combined, these two channels cause output per
worker to rise more in the long-run than in the short-run.
4. Quantitative Model
To quantify the long-run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages, we extend the
model from Section 3 in ways that are useful for the numerical analysis, but leave the funda-
mental intuition unchanged. Most importantly, we model power outages as the economy’s en-
dogenous response to a regulated electricity price that the government fixes below the market-
clearing level. As a result, the supply of grid electricity is less than the demand. The amount of
rationing, and hence the probability of grid power, is determined so that the rationed demand
for grid power equals the amount supplied at the regulated price.
Additionally, the quantitative model includes hired labor as a production input in the tra-
ditional and modern sectors. It also adds additional parameters in the Leontief production
functions to allow them to better match the data and specifies the distribution of entrepreneur
productivity. We describe the main features of the quantitative model below. We relegate the
definition of an equilibrium to Appendix B.
Grid electricity production. We design a simple model of grid electricity production that
captures the key features of electricity markets in developing countries discussed in Section 2,
specifically the low electricity prices and frequent outages. We abstract from other aspects of
electricity production, such as the degree of market power, different sources of electricity, and
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distinctions between generation, transmission, and distribution. These are important issues
for some questions, but are not first order for our analysis.
There are measure one of electricity producers. Each electricity producer produces electricity
from land, bt , and grid capital, k
G




Parameter ψ denotes capital’s share in grid-electricity production. The supply of land useful
for electricity (e.g., hydro dam sites) is fixed and owned by the government. The electricity
producers pay a licensing fee, Q t , for each unit of land.
The electricity producer chooses grid capital, kGt , and land, bt , to maximize profits, taking as
given the grid electricity price, the licensing fee, and the rental rate for grid capital. Profits for
each grid-electricity producer are:
πGt = P
GAG(kGt )
ψx1−ψ−Rt kGt −Q t bt . (11)
We assume that in equilibrium, the government sets the licensing fee, Q t , so that the fixed
supply of land is used at full capacity and all electricity producers earn zero profits (though
this assumption is not central to our results). We normalize the supply of land to unity. The



















Note that the key implication of equation (12) is that electricity producers respond to an in-
crease in PG by raising their supply of electricity. The aggregate demand for grid capital and
the aggregate supply of grid electricity equal the respective sums of capital demand and supply















In line with the evidence discussed in Section 2, the government sets the grid-electricity price,
PG, at a value below that which would clear the grid-electricity market. Therefore, the price,
PG, does not clear the electricity market as it would in a standard competitive model. Instead,
we assume that the probability that the power is on, vt , adjusts endogenously to ensure that the








t (1,z) dG(z). (13)
If the government raises the grid-electricity price, then equation (12) implies that electricity
producers increase production, raising the supply of grid electricity. Holding demand constant,
the increase in electricity supply raises the probability of grid power, vt , that solves equation
(13). On the demand side, the increase in the price of grid electricity reduces grid-electricity
demand, while the increase in the probability of grid power operates though the firm-expansion
and firm-entry channels to increase grid-electricity demand. In general equilibrium, the prob-
ability of grid power that solves equation (13) for each grid-electricity price depends on both
the supply- and demand-side factors.
Labor, self-generation, and managerial productivity. The household is endowed with one
unit of labor which she supplies inelastically to the labor market. She earns labor income Wt
in each period t. Both traditional and modern firms use labor, in addition to capital, in the pro-













Parameter α denotes capital’s share in the capital-labor composite and parameter µ controls
how much electricity is required to operate the capital-labor composite. Parameter AT denotes
the TFP of the traditional sector. We define parameter φ > 1 to be the TFP boost from the
modern production technology: AM ≡φAT .
The production function for self-generated electricity is:
eSit = A
S min[kSt , χ fi t], (15)
where parameter AS is TFP in the production of self-generated electricity and parameter χ
controls how much fuel is required to operate the self-generation capital.






where λ> 1 and z ∈ [1,∞]. (16)
The equilibrium is defined as in Section 3, but now the probability of grid power, vt , adjusts
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to clear the grid-electricity market and the wage, Wt , adjusts to clear the labor market.
5. Calibration
We calibrate the model to provide quantitative estimates of the effects of power outages on
output per worker and the contribution of the different general equilibrium channels. We
focus on five major Sub-Saharan African economies: Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, and
Uganda. We first compute a baseline calibration using data from the Nigerian economy. We
then recalibrate TFP and the key electricity-related parameters to match targets specific to each
country in our study. The time period in the model is one year. We report all monetary values
in year 2014 US dollars. We relegate the description of the data sources to Appendix C.
Baseline calibration for the Nigerian economy. The calibration has two steps. First, we
choose some parameters directly from the data and existing literature. Given these directly
calibrated parameters, we choose a second set of parameters such that moments in the model
match their empirical targets. Table 1 reports the values of the directly calibrated parameters.
Table 1: Parameter Values: Direct Calibration
η α AT φ γ δ AG ψ σ β
0.85 0.33 1 1.4 0.91 0.06 1 0.7 2 0.96
Note: This table reports the baseline parameter values that we take from existing estimates.
We set the span-of-control parameter, η, equal to 0.85, as in Midrigan and Xu (2014). We use
one third for capital’s share in the capital-labor composite, α= 0.33. We set the depreciation
rate, the CRRA coefficient and the discount rate equal to standard values of 0.06, 2 and 0.96,
respectively. Parameter γ equals the fraction of modern entrepreneurs that have access to
generators. Viewing the World Enterprise Surveys as a survey of modern firms, parameter γ
corresponds to the fraction of firms that report access to generators (Figure 2), adjusted for
the fact that not all firms in the World Enterprise Surveys experience outages (Figure 1). In
Nigeria, 77.6 percent of firms experience outages and 70.7 percent of firms have access to
generators. Thus, γ equals the fraction of firms that experience outages that have access to
generators, γ= 70.7/77.6= 0.91.
We are not aware of any direct empirical estimates of the price elasticity grid electricity, which
would help pin down the value of ψ. Instead, we choose ψ= 0.7 to reflect the relatively high
capital share in electricity in the data. Section 6 reports the sensitivity of the main results to
alternative values of this parameter.
We normalize grid-productivity, AG, and traditional productivity, AT , both to unity. Modern pro-
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ductivity parameter, φ, determines the productivity boost an entrepreneur receives by switch-
ing to the modern production technology. We set φ = 0.4, in line with the productivity differ-
ence between the traditional and modern sectors in Midrigan and Xu (2014). Consistent with
this choice, Lagakos (2016) finds that the productivity of the modern segment of the retail
sector is on average 43 percent larger than the productivity of the traditional segment, based
on data from six lower income economies. Section 6 explores the sensitivity of the main results
to alternative values of φ and shows that the results are not as sensitive to this parameter as
one might expect.
Table 2: Parameter Values: Method of Moments
µ χ AS PG Ω λ
1.59 2.14 1.30 0.08 0.27 3.16
Note: This table reports the baseline parameter values that we choose to match the empirical targets.
We jointly calibrate the remaining parameters, {AS,χ, PG,λ,µ,Ω} so that moments in the model
match their empirical targets. Table 2 reports the resulting parameter values. We discuss each
parameter and its primary target in turn.
The grid-electricity price, PG, largely determines the level of grid capital, KG, which in turn con-
trols the supply of grid electricity. All else constant, the supply of grid electricity governs how
much electricity firms can purchase from the grid and how much they must self-produce from
generators. The World Enterprise Survey reports that Nigerian firms self-generate 58.8 per-
cent of their total electricity consumption. We choose the regulated level of the grid-electricity
price, PG, to match this target.
The ratio of the average cost of self-generated electricity (green columns of Figure 3) to the
average cost of grid electricity (blue columns of Figure 3) pins down self-generation productiv-
ity, AS. For grid electricity, the firm’s average cost equals the marginal cost, PG. However, for
self-generated electricity, the average cost differs from the marginal cost because the firm must
incur the fixed cost of renting the generator. To calculate the average cost of self-generated
electricity, we add the variable cost calculated above to estimates of the capital and mainte-
nance costs of a typical diesel generator (see Appendix C). The average cost of self-generated
electricity equals 34 cents per kWh, 5.51 times larger than the average cost of grid electricity.
Parameters Ω and λ affect the number and size of modern firms. Using data from the Nigerian
Survey of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises, we find that the modern sector employs 63
percent of workers and includes 30 percent of firms. We choose Ω and λ to match these two
targets.
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Table 3: Model Fit
Moment Model Target
(variable cost of self-generation)/(grid-electricity price) 4.33 4.33
(average cost of self-generation)/(grid-electricity price) 5.51 5.51
Fraction of self-generated electricity 0.59 0.59
Modern electricity share 0.07 0.07
Fraction of modern labor 0.63 0.63
Fraction of modern entrepreneurs 0.30 0.30
Note: This table reports the empirical and model values of the moments used to calibrate the parameters in
Table 2 for the baseline economy. We compute the modern electricity share in the model in a counterfactual
steady state in which the probability of grid power equals 0.93. All the parameters in Table 2 are jointly
determined by all of the moments. The model matches the targets out to four decimal places.
Finally, the Leontief parameter in final goods production, µ, determines electricity’s share of
modern production. Allcott et al. (2016) estimate that electricity share equals 7.4 percent
of value added among Indian manufacturing firms.6 Since, electricity expenditures include
expenditures on both grid and self-generated electricity, the probability of grid power could
affect the electricity share. Furthermore, the probability of grid power in the Nigerian economy
likely differs from Allcott et al. (2016)’s reported probability of 0.93 for Indian manufacturing
firms. To align our model as closely as possible with the empirical target, we choose µ so
that modern electricity share equals 7.4 percent in a counterfactual steady state in which the
probability of grid power in Nigeria equals 0.93. Table 3 reports the values of the moments in
the model and the data. The model matches the targeted moments out to four decimal places.
Country-specific calibration. We re-calibrate the electricity-related parameters, {AS,χ,γ, PG}
and traditional productivity, AT , for each remaining country in our study. All other parameter
values are constant across countries and equal to their values in the baseline calibration (Tables
1 and 2). Appendix Table C.3 reports the values of the country-specific parameters.
For each country, we measure the fraction of modern firms that have access to generators, γ,
directly from the World Enterprise Survey data reported in Figure 2, adjusting for the frequen-
cies of outages reported in Figure 1. We calibrate the remaining four parameters so that four
moments in the model directly match their corresponding empirical targets. In particular, we
choose χ and AS for each country to match the ratios of the average and marginal cost of self-
generated electricity relative to grid electricity (using the same data as in Figure 3). We choose
the regulated grid-electricity price in each country, PG, to match the frequency of outages in the
specific country relative to its value in Nigeria. We measure the relative frequency of outages as
6Similarly, Fisher-Vanden et al. (2015) find that the electricity share of value added equals 6 percent among
Chinese manufacturing firms.
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the number of outages in a typical month, as reported in the World Enterprise Surveys. We de-
termine the country-specific values of AT to match the ratio of output per worker in the specific
country relative to its value in Nigeria. Appendix Table C.4 reports the values of these country-
specific targets. The calibrated model in each country matches the corresponding targets out
to four decimal places.
Figure 6: Percent of Modern Firms With Generators
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Note: The left panel plots the percent of firms with generators as a function of firm size in our model, averaged
across the five countries. We normalize the firm size of the average modern-sector firm to unity. The right
panel plots the average percent of firms with generator ownership, as reported in Foster and Steinbuks (2008)
Table 1c. The data, originally from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, cover a range of African countries.
Our calibrated model does well at matching several features of the data that we do not specif-
ically target. First, the empirical evidence suggests that firms with generators are larger than
those without (see e.g. Foster and Steinbuks, 2008; Alby et al., 2013). In our model, modern
firms with generator access endogenously choose a larger scale than firms without, replicating
this empirical regularity. The left panel of Figure 6 plots the percent of firms with generators as
a function of firm size in our model, averaged across all five countries. The right panel plots the
corresponding empirical relationship between firm size and generator ownership, as reported
in Foster and Steinbuks (2008). Generator ownership increases substantially with firm size in
both the model and the data.
Additionally, in Section 7 we conduct firm-level surveys in Ghana and Nigeria to validate our
two main general equilibrium channels. Consistent with our model, we find that the majority
of modern-sector business owners in both countries believe that eliminating outages would
cause them scale up production and cause more firms to enter their sector.
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6. Quantitative Results
In our main experiment, we simulate the effects of eliminating outages by letting the price
of grid electricity adjust to clear markets.7 Introducing a market-clearing electricity price is
a purely counterfactual exercise in the sense that no African country has implemented such a
reform (Eberhard et al., 2011). Hence, our model provides the necessary laboratory to explore
how increasing the electricity price to eliminate outages would affect output, consumption,
and other macroeconomic aggregates.
Table 4: Grid Electricity Price, Capital, and Supply
(percent change from initial steady state)
Grid price: PG Grid capital: KG Grid electricity: EG
Ethiopia 77 577 281
Ghana 22 95 60
Nigeria 81 621 299
Tanzania 41 212 122
Uganda 24 104 65
Note: Column (1) reports the percent increase in the grid-electricity price from its value in each country’s
initial steady state necessary to eliminate outages. Columns (2) and (3) report the corresponding percent
increases in grid-electricity capital and supply.
Long-run general-equilibrium effects of eliminating power outages. To quantify the long-
run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages in each country, we compare the country’s
initial calibrated steady state with a counterfactual “no-outages” steady state. In the no-outages
steady state, we de-regulate the electricity market by allowing the price to adjust so that grid-
electricity supply exactly equals demand. The resulting increase in the grid-electricity price
eliminates outages by increasing the supply of grid capital and grid electricity (equation 12).
The first column of Table 4 reports the percent increase in the grid-electricity price between
the initial and no-outages steady states in each country. The second and third columns report
the corresponding increases in grid-electricity capital and supply. Eliminating outages requires
substantial increases in grid-electricity prices in all five countries, ranging from 22 percent in
Ghana to 81 percent in Nigeria. The higher grid electricity prices lead to considerable increases
in grid electricity capital, which, in turn, raises grid electricity supply.
7Note that this experiment involves raising price as well as increasing the reliability of the grid. Raising the
price alone has negative effects on firms in the model, since it raises production costs and reduces output. This
is consistent with the empirical findings of Abeberese (2017), who documents that higher electricity prices for
Indian manufacturing firms resulted in lower output and labor productivity growth.
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LR, GE, firm-expansion channel
LR, GE, firm-expansion and firm-entry channels
Note: The height of each bar equals the total steady-state increase in output per worker from eliminating
power outages in each country. The green, blue and purple regions of each bar correspond to the relative
contributions from the short-run partial-equilibrium effect, the firm-expansion channel and the firm-entry
channel, respectively.
Figure 7 plots the long-run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages. Eliminating out-
ages leads to large increases in output per worker in all countries, ranging from 12.4 percent
in Uganda to 27.7 percent in Nigeria. Ethiopia, Ghana, and Tanzania are in the middle, with
increases in output per worker equal to 24.6, 18.1, and 20.3 percent, respectively. Averag-
ing across all five countries, eliminating outages increases output per worker in the long-run
general equilibrium by approximately 20 percent.
To better understand the sources of productivity gains from eliminating outages, we decompose
the total increase in output per worker into three components, corresponding to the three
sections of each bar in Figure 7. The green section shows the short-run partial-equilibrium
effect, which is the increase in output per worker that results when outages are eliminated ex-
post, after entrepreneurs have already made their scale and entry decisions. Specifically, we
hold firm size, the productivity cutoff, and all prices constant and compute output per worker
if the probability of grid power equals one, instead of its value in the initial steady state. This
exercise is truly partial equilibrium in the sense that we do not require the markets for capital,
labor, or electricity to clear.
Consistent with the microeconomic evidence (e.g., Allcott et al., 2016, and the other studies
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cited in the introduction), the short-run partial-equilibrium effects of eliminating outages are
small, ranging from 3.0 percent in Uganda to 7.6 percent in Nigeria. Averaging across all five
countries, eliminating outages in the short-run partial equilibrium only increases output per
worker by approximately 5 percent. Comparing the short-run partial-equilibrium effect with
the long-run general-equilibrium effect (equal to the full height of each bar in Figure 7) reveals
that the long-run general-equilibrium effects are over four times larger, on average. Hence, as
Buera et al. (2019) also find in the microfinance context, the short-run partial equilibrium
effect is an important component of the total macroeconomic impact, but it is far from the
whole story.
The large long-run effects do not result from large (counterfactual) short-run partial-equilibrium
effects, but instead from the additional increases in output per worker generated by the firm-
expansion and firm-entry channels. The blue and purple sections of each bar represent the
increase in output per worker from adding the firm-expansion and firm-entry channels, re-
spectively. To isolate the effects of the firm-expansion channel (blue sections), we solve for
a no-outages steady state in which the productivity cutoff, z?, is fixed at its value in the ini-
tial steady state. In this exercise, all markets clear, but entrepreneurs’ sector decisions do not
necessarily satisfy the entry condition in equation (9). The additional increase in output per
worker from the firm-entry channel (purple sections) equals the difference between the no-
outages steady state and the no-outages steady state with the productivity cutoff fixed at its
value in the initial steady state.
As Figure 7 shows, both the firm-entry and the firm-expansion channels are large relative to
the short-run partial-equilibrium effect. The firm-entry channel is somewhat larger than the
firm-expansion channel (i.e., the purple sections of each bar are larger than the blue sections)
because the ability of the firm-expansion channel to increase output per worker is constrained
by the size of the modern sector in the initial steady state. While all existing modern firms
scale up production, if there are very few modern firms, then this increase in scale will have
only a small effect on output per worker. Indeed, Ethiopia has the smallest modern sector in
the initial steady state (see Appendix Table D.1) and experiences the largest difference in the
effects of the firm-expansion and firm-entry channels.
To quantify the broader macroeconomic consequences of eliminating outages in each country,
Table 5 reports the percent change in a number of variables in the no-outages steady state
relative to their values in the initial steady state. Eliminating outages leads to substantial
increases in the size of the modern sector, measured either by the number of modern firms, QM ,
or by the number of modern workers, N M (first two rows of Table 5). Since the total numbers of
firms and workers are fixed, the increases in the numbers modern firms and workers generate
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parallel decreases in the numbers of traditional firms and workers.
Table 5: Effects of Eliminating Outages on Macro Aggregates
(percent change from the initial steady state)
Ethiopia Ghana Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Modern entrepreneurs: QM 448 85 141 172 82
Modern labor: N M 212 29 53 79 42
Wage rate: W 13 17 25 14 8
Modern productive capital: K M 254 51 91 103 54
Traditional capital: K T -61 -73 -85 -61 -44
Aggregate capital stock: K 36 17 30 26 15
Measured TFP: Y /(K̃αN1−α) 11 12 17 11 7
Consumption: C 15 14 21 13 8
Note: This table reports the percent change in a number of variables in the no-outages steady state from their
corresponding values in the initial steady state. Measured TFP equals aggregate output divided by a Cobb-
Douglas aggregate of measured capital and labor, K̃αN1−α, where α equals 0.33. Measured capital, K̃ , equals
the aggregate capital stock plus entry costs.
Eliminating outages leads to large increases in the equilibrium wage, ranging from 8 percent
in Uganda to 25 percent in Nigeria (third row of Table 5). The reason for the increase in wages
is that the number of modern firms increases and existing modern firms rent additional capital
and purchase more electricity, all of which increase the marginal product of labor. The rental
rate of capital is pinned down entirely by the household-Euler equation and is thus unchanged,
as in the analytic version of the model in Section 3. Productive capital in the traditional and
modern sectors moves in opposite directions (fourth and fifth rows of Table 5). The combined
effects of the firm-expansion and firm-entry channels lead to substantial increases in productive
capital in the modern sector. Capital in the traditional sector falls both because the firm-entry
channel implies that there are fewer traditional firms and because the higher wages cause
traditional firms to hire fewer workers, reducing their demand for capital.
The final three rows of Table 5 report the effects of eliminating outages on the aggregate capital
stock, measured TFP, and consumption. Following the development accounting literature (Hall
and Jones, 1999; Caselli, 2005), we define measured TFP as aggregate output, Y , divided by a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate of measured capital and labor, K̃αN1−α, where α equals the calibrated
value of capital share, 0.33. To be conservative, we define measured capital, K̃ , to equal the
aggregate capital stock plus entry costs, which can be thought of as a type of capital.
Eliminating outages leads to substantial increases in the aggregate capital stock, ranging from
15 percent in Uganda to 36 percent in Ethiopia, implying that capital accumulation is an im-
portant driver of the gains in output per worker reported in Figure 7. However, the increases in
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output per worker do not result from capital accumulation alone. We also see large increases in
measured TFP, ranging from 7 percent in Uganda to 17 percent in Nigeria. Eliminating outages
increases measured TFP because it eliminates idle resources and because it shifts entrepreneurs
to the more-productive modern sector. The higher steady-state capital stock and measured TFP
generate substantial increases in consumption.
Sensitivity. To provide insights on the underlying mechanisms driving the quantitative results,
we explore the sensitivity of the results for the Nigerian economy to the following parameter
values and targets: (1) capital’s share in grid electricity production, ψ, (2) the productivity
boost from becoming modern, φ, (3) grid-electricity’s share in modern production, and (4)
the average and marginal costs of self-generated electricity. In each case, we re-calibrate all
the parameters in the Nigerian economy to either match the new set of targets or to account
for the change in the directly calibrated parameter value. The four panels of Table 6 report the
effect of eliminating outages on output per worker in the long-run general equilibrium, (first
column) and in the short-run partial equilibrium (second column). The middle row in every
panel corresponds to the baseline calibration. Comparing the first and second columns reveals
that in every sensitivity exercise, the long-run general equilibrium effect of eliminating outages
is over three times larger than the short-run partial equilibrium effect.
Higher values of the capital share in grid-electricity production, ψ, imply weaker diminishing
returns in grid-electricity production. As a result, de-regulating the electricity market leads
to a smaller increase in the grid-electricity price and a larger increase in the grid-electricity
supply, magnifying the gains in output per worker. Higher values of the modern productivity
boost, φ, increase the gains in output per worker from the firm-entry channel, raising the total
increase in output per worker. However, the impact of changes φ are smaller that one might
expect because the model must match the same empirical targets in the initial steady state.
For example, all else constant, higher values of φ make the modern sector more attractive,
increasing the size and number of modern firms. Consequently, matching the empirical shares
of modern labor and firms with a higher value of φ requires a larger entry cost, Ω, and a larger
Pareto distribution parameter, λ. The larger values of Ω and λ partially offset the impact from
the larger value of φ on the increase in output per worker from eliminating outages.
As one might expect, the effects of eliminating outages depend on electricity’s share of modern
output, which determines the relative importance of electricity as a production input, and on
the costs of self-generation, which determines the cost of electricity during an outage (last two
panels of Table 6). At the extreme lower bound, if electricity did not enter modern production
at all (so that its share equaled zero) or if the cost of self-generation equaled the cost grid elec-
tricity, then eliminating outages would have no effect on output per worker. Increasing either
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of these variables from this lower bound necessarily increases the long-run general-equilibrium
effects of eliminating outages. Importantly, the values used in the baseline calibration for elec-
tricity’s share of modern output and the self-generation costs are disciplined by direct empiri-
cal evidence from developing economies. Thus, while the actual values could always differ, in
practice, we expect that they will be relatively close to the baseline calibration.
Table 6: Sensitivity to Parameter Values and Targets
Percent increase in output
Long run, G.E. Short run, P.E.
Capital share in grid-electricity production: ψ
ψ= 0.6 21 6
ψ= 0.7 28 8
ψ= 0.8 34 9
Modern productivity boost: φ
φ = 0.3 26 7
φ = 0.4 28 8
φ = 0.5 31 8
Electricity share of modern output
Share = 0.05 22 5
Share = 0.074 28 8
Share = 0.1 35 11
Self-generation costs
50 percent decrease in costs 20 5
Baseline costs 28 8
50 percent increase in costs 39 12
Note: This table reports the long-run general equilibrium (first column) and short-run partial equilibrium
(second column) percent increase in aggregate output between the initial and no-outages steady states in
the Nigerian economy. The four panels correspond to perturbations of the capital share in grid-electricity
production, the modern productivity boost, the electricity share of modern output in the counterfactual steady
state with v= 0.93, and the self-generation costs. The middle row in every panel is the baseline calibration.
Finally, our main results assume that fraction γ of modern entrepreneurs have access to gener-
ators and fraction 1−γ do not, where the value of γ is disciplined by the evidence on generator
ownership from the World Enterprise Surveys. Importantly, when v< v?, firms with generator
access endogenously choose a larger scale than firms without generator access. However, it is
also possible that generator access is correlated with unobservable firm productivity, z. Since
we have no direct evidence on this correlation, we instead bound our main results in Figure
7 from below by re-calibrating and re-solving our model assuming that all modern firms have
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generator access. We find that while the magnitudes are smaller than in our main results, the
increases in output per worker from eliminating outages are still substantial, ranging from 7.0
percent in Uganda to 23.1 percent in Nigeria (see Appendix Figure D.1).
Insights on weak links and aggregate productivity. One insight from the previous literature
is that aggregate productivity may not be as affected by weak link sectors as one might think,
since a competitive economy can compensate by allocating more inputs to those sectors (Jones,
2011). The logic is that if output from a weak-link sector is sufficiently scarce, then its price
will rise to attract more inputs, thus raising output in the weak-link sector. In our context, with
electricity rationed through power outages, these forces do not operate in the same way. The
electricity price is regulated to be artificially low, which prevents resources from reallocating to
the electricity sector and, as a result, the weak link in the electricity sector can more severely
constrain aggregate output.
To illustrate the how the effects of power outages differ from low productivity in the electricity
sector, Figure 8 plots the responses of output per worker and grid-electricity capital per worker
to an electricity supply shock in our outages economy (solid green line) and in a competitive
economy in which the grid-electricity price adjusts to clear the market (dashed blue line). The
right-most point in both panels corresponds to the counterfactual no-outages steady state for
Nigeria. Moving from right to left along the outages-economy line (solid green), we reduce the
price of grid-electricity so that total electricity supply (grid plus self-generated) in steady state
decreases by the amount on the x-axis. Hence, as one moves from right to left, the probability
of grid power falls and outages become more frequent. The left-most point corresponds to the
initial steady state in the Nigerian economy.8
Moving from right to left along the dashed blue line, we conduct a similar exercise for the com-
petitive economy by reducing productivity in grid-electricity production, AG, by the percentage
on the x-axis. This exercise results in higher grid-electricity prices, but no outages, because the
price endogenously adjusts to clear the grid-electricity market.
The electricity-supply shocks lead to larger decreases in output per worker in the outages
economy than in the competitive economy; moving from right to left in the left panel of Figure
8, the solid green line falls farther and farther below the dashed blue line. Indeed, going all the
way to the initial steady state (left-most point on the x-axis), output per worker falls by over
20 percent in the outages economy but by less than 10 percent in the competitive economy.
8In a small region right around the productivity cutoff, v?, there are two different steady states that generate the
same amount of grid-electricity supply, one in which v< v? and relatively more electricity comes from generators
and one in which v > v? and relatively more electricity comes from the grid. As a convention, we plot only the
steady state with v< v? when there are two steady states. Plotting instead only the steady state with v> v? when
there are two steady states does not meaningfully change the graph.
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Figure 8: Competitive Economy versus Outages Economy
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Grid-Electricity Capital per Worker
Note: This figure plots the responses of output per worker and grid-electricity capital per worker in Nigeria to
an electricity supply shock in our outages economy (solid green line) and in a competitive economy (dashed
blue line). The right-most point on the solid green line in both panels corresponds to the counterfactual no-
outages steady state for Nigeria and the left-most point corresponds to the initial steady state. Moving from
right to left along the outages-economy (solid green) line, we reduce the price of grid-electricity so that total
electricity supply (grid plus self-generated) in steady state decreases by the amount on the x-axis. Moving
from right to left along the dashed blue line, we reduce productivity in grid-electricity production, AG , by the
percentage on the x-axis.
The reason for the difference is that in the competitive economy, the endogenous increase in
the grid-electricity price attracts more capital to the grid-electricity sector, which substitutes
for the low productivity, thus alleviating the constraints on aggregate output. In contrast, in
the outages economy, the artificially low grid-electricity price causes capital to leave the grid-
electricity sector, reducing supply and creating outages. The right panel of Figure 8 illustrates
these opposite responses; moving from right to left, grid-capital per worker increases in the
competitive economy (dashed blue line) and decreases in the outages economy (solid green
line).
In sum, the distortions in the electricity sector, caused by artificially depressed prices, funda-
mentally differ from those caused by low sector productivity in a competitive economy. Com-
petitive forces can alleviate the consequences of low productivity by raising the price to attract
more resources to the low-productivity sector. But competitive forces cannot alleviate the con-
sequences of depressed prices since, by design, the price cannot adjust to reflect the true scarcity
of the input. Instead, the depressed prices discourage investment in electricity production, re-
sulting in shortages. Thus, as long as electricity prices are artificially low, the electricity sector
is likely to remain a weak link.
32
7. Supporting Evidence
Our theory predicts that eliminating power outages would cause existing firms to expand their
operations and new firms to operate better technologies that require electricity. In this section,
we use two approaches to validate these two channels. First, we cite the existing empirical
evidence on the effects of outages on firm expansion and firm entry. Second, we provide new
survey evidence from firms in Ghana and Nigeria about the expected effects of permanently
eliminating outages on their businesses and industries.
Existing evidence. It is challenging to empirically estimate the long-run general-equilibrium
effect of eliminating outages because, to our knowledge, no developing country in the modern
era has been able to eliminate outages for any significant period of time. Two studies that
estimate related channels are by Reinikka and Svensson (2002) and Kassem (2020). Using
cross-sectional data from 171 Ugandan firms, Reinikka and Svensson (2002) find that among
firms without generators, those that experience more outages undertake less investment. They
find no statistically significant effect for firms with generators. While the firm-expansion chan-
nel in our model implies that power outages reduce investment for modern firms with and
without generators, the impact is considerably larger for firms without generators, consistent
with Reinikka and Svensson (2002)’s findings.
Kassem (2020) exploits regional variation in the roll out of the Indonesian electric power grid
to estimate the effects of grid connections on the size and structure of the manufacturing sector.
She finds that access to the national electric grid increases both the number and size of manu-
facturing firms. In the context of our model, gaining access to the electric grid corresponds to
an increase in the probability of grid power from zero to some positive number. Hence, we view
her results as supporting the model’s theoretical predictions that increases in the probability of
grid power will cause existing firms to expand and new firms to enter.
New survey results from African firms. To supplement the existing empirical evidence, we
survey firms about their expectations for what would happen if electricity outages were per-
manently eliminated. We do so using new surveys of business owners in Ghana and Nigeria.
The main advantage of this approach is that we can directly ask firms in two of the countries
we include in our analysis about the specific channels in our model.
Our surveys cover a sample of firm owners in Ghana and Nigeria, and were conducted from
June to August 2019. We implemented the surveys with Google Surveys, a platform that allows
users to survey a random sample of internet news readers. The readers are incentivized to take
the survey by being offered free access to the remainder of their news article after completing
the survey. Readers are also given the option to opt out of any survey. We identified business
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owners with an initial screening question about whether the respondent currently owned and
operated a business. We then asked the business owners between three and six additional
questions, depending on the survey. We ran a total of 34 surveys covering 3,425 firms, of
which 1,913 were from Ghana and 1,512 were from Nigeria. The overall dropout rate was
low after the initial screening question, at slightly less than 14 percent, and we kept only those
responding to all questions, which was most of the respondents.
Not surprisingly, the business owners in our surveys were disproportionately educated and
living in urban areas. In Ghana, for example, 89 percent of respondents had completed sec-
ondary school or more and 93 percent came from the largest two cities of Accra and Kumasi.
One would not want to use these surveys to learn about rural farmers or entrepreneurs in the
traditional sector in urban centers. Yet they may not be a bad approximation to those operating
in the modern sector in our model, since modern-sector entrepreneurs in the model are those
with the highest productivity levels.
Importantly, firms in our surveys were representative in that they reported regularly expe-
riencing power outages and use of generators to self-produce power. When asked about the
frequency of power outages in the last year, the most common answer in both countries was 10
or more times, with 46 percent of Nigerians and 23 of Ghanians selecting this answer. Just 23
percent of Ghanian firms and of 11 percent of Nigerian firms reported not having any outages
in the last year. On average, 55 percent of firms in Ghana and 85 percent in Nigeria reported
that they owned or had access to a generator. These statistics line up well with those from the
World Bank Enterprise Surveys presented in Section 2. Firms in our survey are also consistent
with World Bank Enterprise Surveys in their skewness toward smaller firm sizes relative to
richer countries (see Appendix E), and their industry composition being primarily services and
only partly manufacturing and agriculture.
To understand how eliminating power outages would affect firms in the developing world,
we asked a series of hypothetical questions to the Ghanaian and Nigerian firm owners about
their expectations for what would happen if outages were eliminated. We focused on four
main outcomes: profits, expansion through investment, expansion through hiring, and entry
of new firms in the same industry. For the first three questions we ask about the effects of
eliminating power outages “for your firm” and for the last we specify that power outages would
be eliminated in their country. For all questions we asked how likely the firms felt each outcome
would be if power outages were eliminated, with the options being “very unlikely,” “unlikely,”
“neutral,” “likely,” “very likely” and “I don’t know.”
One potential limitation of any survey – and online surveys in particular – is that respondents
may provide uninformative answers or answers based on what they expect the surveyors would
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Eliminate power outages Placebo Difference
Note: This figure plots the percent of firms answering that each effect is “likely” or “very likely” if power
outages were permanently eliminated (red bars). The other choices are “very unlikely,” “unlikely,” “neutral”
and “don’t know.” The frame of references is a placebo scenario in when the national airports would convert
to solar power (orange bars). The difference is plotted (yellow bars) along with ***,** or * to represent the p-
value of the test of the null hypothesis that the difference between eliminating power outages and the placebo
is zero being less than 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent.
like to hear. In order to measure how common this is among the respondents in our setting, we
ran a series of surveys that asked firms about the expected effects of a placebo “treatment” in
which the national airports in Ghana or Nigeria convert to solar power. The advantage of this
placebo treatment is that it is a policy issue related to electricity, as in our main questions about
eliminating power outages, but it would be quite unlikely to affect the vast majority of firms.
In all of the surveys about the placebo treatment, we asked about exactly the same outcomes
35
and used the exact same response options as the main surveys on power outages, so as to make
apples-to-apples comparisons.
Figure 9 plots the percentage of firms responding that each outcome would be “likely” or “very
likely” if power outages were permanently eliminated. As a frame of reference we plot the
percentage responding that each outcome would be “likely” or “very likely” under the placebo
treatment. We also plot the simple difference between the two percentages, and summarize
the p-values of a test of the difference in the two proportions with three, two or one stars to
represent significance at the 1-, 5- and 10-percent level. Panels (a) and (b) present the results
from Ghana and Nigeria, respectively.
As Figure 9 shows, the majority of firms owners expect that eliminating power outages for their
firm would raise profits and lead them to expand by making new investments and increasing
hiring. Relative to the placebo treatment, 25.4 percent more Ghanaian firms and 41.6 percent
more Nigerian firms expect that eliminating power outages would be “likely” or “very likely”
to raise their profits. Firms in both countries were also significantly more likely to report that
eliminating power outages would lead them to expand through increased investment or by
increasing their hiring. These differences are all statistically significant at the 5-percent level or
lower. These results provide support for the model’s predictions that permanently eliminating
power outages would lead firms to expand.
The last columns of Figure 9 report the firms’ expectations for how eliminating power outages
would affect the entry of new firms into their industries. Relative to the placebo, 39 percent
more Ghanaian firms report that eliminating power outages would be likely or very likely
to increase entry. In Nigeria, it is 25.8 percent more firms. Both are statistically significant
differences, suggesting that firms do expect that eliminating outages would increase entry, as
our model predicts.
8. Conclusion
Unreliable electricity is widely thought by policymakers to be a major constraint on firm pro-
ductivity in the developing world. Yet most empirical studies of how power outages affect
firm performance conclude that eliminating outages would lead to very modest productivity
increases. Our paper is the first to model and quantify the long-run general-equilibrium effects
of eliminating power outages. In contrast to the previous literature, we find that eliminating
outages generates large increases in aggregate output per worker across the five Sub-Saharan
African countries in our study, on the order of 20 percent. Through the lens of development
accounting, eliminating outages works through increases in aggregate capital per worker, as
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firms expand, and through increases in TFP, as fewer productive resources are idled and more
firms operate with more-productive, electricity-using technologies.
Our model abstracts from several mechanisms through which electricity could increase output
per capita, implying that our quantitative results may be a lower bound. First, temporary out-
ages may permanently damage production. The production of semiconductors represents one
extreme, in which a split-second interruption in the power supply reportedly damaged chips
that take weeks to produce (Clark and Osawa, 2010). These potential disruptions imply that
frequent power outages could deter some industries, such as semiconductors, from locating in
a country altogether. On the household side, electricity may also raise labor supply through
the adoption of time-saving home appliances (Dinkelman, 2011; Gertler, Shelef, Wolfram, and
Fuchs, 2016) or encourage human capital accumulation (Vidart, 2020). Future work should
explore other channels through which electricity raises income levels in the long run.
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Appendix: For Online Publication Only
A. Solution to the Analytic Version of the Model
Proof of Proposition 1: For firms with and without generator access, the result that capital
demand is increasing in the probability of grid power follows directly from the first order
condition for capital. We focus instead on understanding the cutoff, v?(Rt), below which firms
with generator access purchase enough generator capital to operate at full capacity during an
outage.
The firm always idles generator capital when the power is on because the price of grid elec-
tricity is zero, and this is lower than the marginal cost of fuel to operate the generator (which
equals unity). Whether the firm idles productive capital when the power is off depends criti-
cally on whether the constraint that kSt ≤ k
M
t binds. We show that this constraint binds for all
values of v less than the cutoff, v∗(Rt), which we will characterize below.
The modern firm’s first order conditions for kSt , and k
M
t from (8) are:
kSt : η(1− vt)A
Mz1−η(kSt )
η−1= Rt+1− v+θ (17)
kMt : ηvA
Mz1−η(kMt )
η−1+θ = Rt , (18)
























The constraint does not bind as long as kMt > k
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The left-hand side of equation (21) is increasing in v. Define v∗(Rt) to be the value of v that
makes (21) hold with equality given Rt . When v < v
∗(Rt), the constraint binds and the firm
rents enough generator capital to operate at full capacity when the power is off. As a result,
there are zero idle resources during instants without power. When v ≥ v∗(Rt), the constraint
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does not bind and the firm rents less generator capital that what is required to operate her
productive capital. In this case, she must idle some productive capital when the power is off.
Power outages are entirely responsible for the existence of idle resources. When there are
no power outages, v = 1, and equation (20) implies that generator capital equals zero. Zero
generator capital combined with zero instants without power results in zero idle resources.
Modern sector entry: We show that the difference in expected profits, E(πM (z))−πT (z) is
increasing in z. The difference in expected profits for a given entrepreneur with productivity z
equals:
E(πM (z))−πT (z) = γπM (1,z)+(1−γ)πM (0,z)−πT (z)
Substituting in the relationship that profits equal fraction 1−η of output yields:





















































Substituting equations (23) - (24) into equation (22) shows that E(πM (z))−πT (z) is increasing





Proof of Proposition 2: The household’s first order condition for capital implies that the





and hence the steady-state price of capital does not depend on the probability of grid power.
It follows that an increase in v does not affect profits for a traditional firm. Therefore, we only
need to show that expected profits for a potential modern entrant with a given z are increasing
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in v. By the envelope theorem:
∂ E(πM (z))
∂ v





Note that the expectation is taken over x , the indicator variable which determines if the firm
has generator access. If v< v?, then firms with generator access operate at full capacity when
the power is off, implying that yM0 (1,z)= y
M
1 (1,z). When v> v
?, yM1 (1,z)> y
M
0 (1,z). In either
case, equation (26) is positive, implying that E(πM (z)) is increasing in v.
Proof of Proposition 3: We define steady state A to be the steady state of the economy when
the probability of grid power is va<1. We use this steady state as a baseline from which to cal-
culate the short-run partial-equilibrium and long-run general-equilibrium effects of eliminating
outages. The first order conditions from the traditional firm’s profit maximization problem im-
ply that capital demand for a traditional firm with productivity, z in steady state A equals:







Similarly, the first order conditions from the modern firm’s profit maximization problem im-
ply that productive capital demand for a modern firm with generator access x ∈ {0,1} and
productivity z in steady state A equals:






























: va > v
?(R).
(28)























: va > v
?(R).
(29)
Let z?a denote the equilibrium productivity cutoff in steady state A. To calculate aggregate
output, we substitute the above expressions for capital demand in each sector into the re-
spective production functions (equations (3) and (4)) and integrate over the distribution of
43
entrepreneurs. Aggregate output in the traditional, Y Ta , and modern, Y
M
































































zdG(z) : va > v?(R).
(31)
Aggregate output, Ya, equals the sum of aggregate output in the traditional and modern sectors:
Ya = Y Ta +Y
M
a .
We compute the short-run partial-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages. Define Ỹ to equal
aggregate output when v= 1, but the productivity cutoff equals its value when v= va (z?a) and
the demands for capital equal their values when v = va (equations (27) - (29)):








































zdG(z) : va > v?(R).
(32)
The short-run partial-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages equals Ỹ −Ya. This represents
the difference between output when firms choose their scale and sector but experience no
outages ex-post and actual output.
To compute the long-run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages, we define steady
state B to be the steady state of the economy when v=1. Let z?b be the equilibrium productivity





















Aggregate output in steady state B equals Yb = Y Tb + Y
M
b . The long-run general-equilibrium
effect of eliminating outages equals Yb− Ya. This represents the difference between output
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in the steady state with no outages and output in the steady state with outages when the
probability of grid power equals va.
To demonstrate that the long-run general-equilibrium effect of eliminating outages exceeds
the short-run partial-equilibrium effect, we must show that Yb−Ya > Ỹ −Ya. First, note that
by Proposition 2, the productivity cutoff in steady state B is less than the productivity cutoff in
steady state A: z?b < z
?
























We show that the right-hand-side of equation (33) is larger than the value of Ỹ defined in
equation (32). First, observe that the first term on the right-hand-side of equation (33) equals
Y Ta . Second, one can show that the second term on the right-hand-side of equation (33) always
exceeds the second term in equation (32). Therefore, it follows that Yb> Ỹ which implies that
Yb−Ya > Ỹ −Ya.
Definition of a competitive equilibrium: We define a sequence-of-markets equilibrium for
this economy. We denote whether a modern firm has generator access with indicator variable
x ∈ {0,1}, where x = 1 denotes generator access and x = 0 denotes no access. A sequence-
of-markets equilibrium consists of: a sequence of rental rates of capital, {Rt}∞t=0; productivity
cutoffs, {z?t }
∞
t=0; household allocations, {Ct ,Kt}
∞









t=0 for all x ∈{0,1} and for all z∈ [1,∞] such that:
1. Given prices, allocations of entrepreneurs across the traditional and modern sectors are
consistent with the modern-sector productivity cutoffs, {z?t }
∞
t=0, defined in equation (9).
2. Given prices, traditional-sector allocations solve the profit maximization problem for all
firms in the traditional sector and modern-sector allocations solve the profit maximization
problem for all firms in the modern sector.











and the non-negativity constraints, Ct ≥ 0, and Kt ≥ 0, where πTt (z) are the profits of the
traditional firms with productivity z, πMt (x ,z) are the profits of the modern firms with
45
generator access, x , and productivity z.












We are interested primarily in how eliminating outages effects the economy in the long-run.
For this it is useful to define a steady state competitive equilibrium, which consists of a constant
rental rate, R; productivity cutoff z?; household allocations, {C ,K}; and entrepreneurial allo-
cations {kT (z),kS(1,z),kM (x ,z),eG1 (x ,z), f0(1,z)} for all x ∈ {0,1} and for all z ∈ [1,∞] such
that conditions (1)-(4) hold and all variables are constant from one period to the next.
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B. Quantitative Version of the Model
Definition of a competitive equilibrium. We define a sequence-of-markets equilibrium for





t=0, allocations for the households {Ct ,Kt+1}
∞












1t(x ,z), f0t(x ,z)}
∞
t=0 for all x ∈{0,1} and for all
z ∈ [1,∞] such that:
1. Given prices, allocations of entrepreneurs across the traditional and modern sectors are
consistent with the modern-sector productivity cutoffs, {z?t }
∞
t=0, defined in equation (9).
2. Given prices, traditional-sector allocations solve the profit maximization problem for all
entrepreneurs in the traditional sector and modern-sector allocations solve the profit
maximization problem for all entrepreneurs in the modern sector.
3. Given prices and entrepreneurial profits, household allocations maximize (1) subject to
the budget constraints:









and the non-negativity constraints, Ct ≥ 0, and Kt ≥ 0. Variable πTt (z) denotes the prof-
its of traditional firms with productivity z and variable πMt (x ,z) denotes the profits of
modern firms with generator access x and productivity z.


























We calculate the average and variable costs of self-generation in each country. All cross-country
variation in these cost estimates comes from variation in diesel fuel prices; we assume that the
capital and maintenance costs of self-generation are the same for all countries. We use esti-
mates from the World Bank Technical Assessment (World Bank, 2007) to calculate the capital
cost of a typical generator. The Technical Assessment reports that a 100 kW diesel generator
would cost 760 dollars per kW, and last 20 years with a capacity factor of 0.8, (World Bank,
2007). Using an interest rate of 10 percent implies that the annual capital-cost per kWh equals
1.3 cents. The maintenance cost is 5.9 cents per kWh (World Bank, 2007).
We calculate the variable cost of self-generated electricity for the 100 kilowatt diesel generator
with 30 percent efficiency. We use the 2014 price of diesel fuel in each country from the World
Development Indicators. To convert dollars per liter of diesel fuel into dollars per kWh, we
convert liters of diesel fuel into BTUs, and then convert BTUs into kWhs, adjusting for the 30
percent efficiency of the generator.
The average cost per kWh equals the sum of the capital, maintenance and variable costs per
kWh. We use a capacity factor of 0.8 when we construct the average cost ratio in the model to
ensure that it is consistent with the data. Table C.1 reports the average price per liter of diesel
fuel and the variable and average costs of self-generated electricity in each country.
Table C.1: Self-Generation Costs
Country
Diesel Price Variable cost Average cost
($/ltr) ($/kWh) ($/kWh)
Ethiopia 0.89 0.28 0.35
Ghana 1.03 0.32 0.40
Nigeria 0.84 0.26 0.34
Tanzania 1.20 0.38 0.45
Uganda 1.11 0.35 0.42
Note: This first column of this table reports the the price of diesel fuel in 2014 from the World Development
Indicators. The second and third columns report the authors’ calculations of the variable and average cost of
self-generated electricity. All values are in year 2014 dollars.
To calibrate TFP in each country, we compare output per worker in the specific country to
output-per worker in Nigeria. Data on output per worker is from the Penn World Tables. We
use output per worker in each country in the same year as the World Bank Enterprise Survey
for that country, reported in Table C.2.
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Table C.2: Year of the World Enterprise Survey






Note: This table reports the year of the enterprise survey in each country.
The baseline calibration uses measures of size of the modern sector from the 2017 Nigerian Na-
tional Survey of Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (SMEDA, 2017). The survey includes
a representative sample of micro enterprises (those with less than 10 employees) and small
(between 10 and 49 employees) and medium enterprises (between 50 and 199 employees).
There is no information on large enterprises (those with greater than 199 employees). The sur-
vey has two modules: (1) the micro enterprises are covered in the National Integrated Survey
of Households and (2) the small and medium enterprises are covered in National Integrated
Survey of Establishments. The survey covers all major sectors of the Nigerian economy, all
geographic areas, and includes both formal and informal firms. We do not have access to the
raw data from the survey. We take all information from the report, (SMEDA, 2017), assembled
by the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria. The report compiles
two sets of aggregate statistics, one set for micro enterprises and the second set for small and
medium enterprises.
We use the survey results to compute the fraction of firms and workers that use electricity.
The survey reports the average number of hours an enterprise operates with an alternative
source of power. Firms that report zero use of alternative power “have little-to-nil need for
[any] power supply” (SMEDA (2017), page 33). Since these firms do not use electricity in
the production process, they correspond to the traditional sector in our model. Using this
definition, approximately 70 percent of micro enterprises are traditional and 6 percent of small
and medium enterprises are traditional. To calculate the fraction of traditional enterprises
relative to total enterprises, we divide the number of traditional enterprises by the total number
of micro, small, and medium enterprises.9
9We assume that the number of large enterprises equals zero. Micro enterprises are so prevalent that any
reasonable assumption about the number of large enterprises does not have meaningful effects on the fraction
of traditional enterprises. In particular, micro, small and medium enterprises account for 76.5 percent of total
employment in the Nigerian economy, implying that large enterprises employ at most 183,232,27 people. Since
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Table C.3: Country Specific Parameters
Country
Price of grid Self-gen Self-gen Trad. TFP: Generator access
electricity: PG Leontief: χ TFP: AS AT probability: γ
Ethiopia 0.06 2.03 1.16 0.41 0.61
Ghana 0.12 1.75 1.60 0.89 0.58
Nigeria 0.08 2.14 1.30 1.00 0.91
Tanzania 0.09 1.51 2.86 0.51 0.50
Uganda 0.09 1.63 3.26 0.44 0.64
Note: This table reports the values of the country-specific parameters in the model. We measure the fraction
of modern firms with access to generators, γ, directly from the data. We calibrate the remaining parameters
to match the empirical targets in Table C.4.
Table C.4: Country Specific Targets
Country (AC self)/(AC grid) (MC self)/(MC grid) (1− v)/(1− vNGA) Y /YNGA
Ethiopia 8.61 6.84 0.25 0.26
Ghana 3.66 3.00 0.26 0.90
Nigeria 5.51 4.33 1.00 1.00
Tanzania 3.22 2.70 0.27 0.38
Uganda 2.48 2.05 0.19 0.32
Note: This table reports the empirical values of the country-specific targets for each of the five countries in
our study. The targets are: (1) the average cost of self-generated electricity relative to grid electricity, (2)
the marginal cost of self-generated electricity relative to grid electricity, (3) the frequency of outages in the
specific country relative to the frequency in Nigeria and (4) output per worker in the specific country relative
to output per worker in Nigeria.
We calculate the fraction of total workers that are traditional. Approximately, 76.5 percent
of the workers in Nigeria are employed by micro, small, and medium enterprises (SMEDA,
2017). We assume that the remaining 23.5 percent of workers are employed by large firms
in the modern sector. To divide the workers at micro, small and medium enterprises into
the traditional and modern sectors, we need information on how firm-size varies between the
modern and the traditional firms. While this information is not available in the Nigerian survey,
we use the fact that 70.4 percent of micro enterprises and 6 percent of small and medium
enterprises are traditional, and we assume that each traditional micro enterprise employs one
person and each traditional small and medium enterprise employs 10 people.
We use the US GDP deflator to convert all monetary values to 2014 dollars.
each large enterprise must employ 200 or more people, there can be at most 183,232,27/200 = 91,616 large
enterprises. If we assume that there are 91,616 large enterprises, instead of zero, and all large enterprises are
modern, then the fraction of traditional enterprises decreases from 0.703 to 0.701.
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Tables C.3 and C.4 report the values of the country-specific parameters and targets, respec-
tively. All moments in the model match their corresponding empirical targets out to four deci-
mal places.
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D. Additional Results From the Quantitative Model
Table D.1: Equilibrium Values of Macro-Aggregates in the Initial Steady State
Ethiopia Ghana Nigeria Tanzania Uganda
Grid-electricity price: PG 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.09
Grid-electricity capital: KG 0.06 0.51 0.16 0.17 0.22
Grid-electricity supply: EG 0.14 0.63 0.27 0.29 0.34
Fraction of modern labor: N M 0.24 0.73 0.63 0.46 0.53
Fraction of modern entrepreneurs: QM 0.06 0.36 0.30 0.15 0.19
Probability of grid power: v 0.85 0.85 0.41 0.84 0.89
Note: This table reports the equilibrium values of a number of variables in the initial steady state in each country.
While the units of the grid-electricity price, capital, and supply are not meaningful independent of the model, the
comparison of the different values across countries is meaningful. In particular, note that grid electricity price,
capital, and supply are extremely low in Ethiopia in the initial steady state.
Figure D.1: Long-Run General-Equilibrium Effect of Eliminating Outages When All Modern













































LR, GE, firm-expansion channel
LR, GE, firm-expansion and firm-entry channels
Note: The height of each bar equals the total steady-state increase in output per worker from eliminating
power outages in each country in the counterfactual world in which all modern firms have access to gener-
ators in the initial steady state. The green, blue and purple regions of each bar correspond to the relative
contributions from the short-run partial-equilibrium effect, the firm-expansion channel and the firm-entry
channel, respectively.
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E. Additional Survey Results

























Note: This figure reports the frequency of power outages in the previous year among the surveyed firms in
Ghana (red) and Nigeria (yellow).















































Note: This figure reports the average monthly revenues among the surveyed firms in Ghana (red) and Nigeria
(yellow).
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